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The notion of interdependent preferences has a long history in economic 
thought. It  can be found in the works of  authors such as Hume,  Rae, 
Genovesi,  Smith, Marx and Mill among others. In the 20th century, the idea 
became more widespread  mainly through the works of Veblen and 
Duesenberry. Recently, an increasing number of theorists are interested in 
issues like reference income, relative consumption and positional goods 
which are all based on the concept of interdependent preferences.  However, 
such preferences were never part of the corpus of orthodox theory. For 
instance,   although Pareto and Marshall were aware of their existence, they 
rejected their incorporation into economic theory. There were various reasons 
for this rejection. The structure of mainstream economic methodology might 
be one reason. Another reason had to do with the theoretical implications of 
adopting interdependent preferences.  The  paper discusses the  main 
historical aspects of this idea in relation to the mainstream resistance to 
incorporate it in orthodox economic theory.   
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The concept of interdependent preferences, and its closely related 
notion of positional goods, are present in the works of a  substantial  number 
of economists in the history of economic thought. One can even find the basis  
of the above ideas in the theories of 18th century authors such as  A. 
Genovesi and  D. Hume and also in  a great number of classical economists  
such as  Smith, Ricardo, Marx,  Senior, Mill  and many others, who  discuss 
these issues in sympathetic terms. In addition, it plays a central role in the 
contributions  of many very well-known post-marginalist economists such as 
T. Veblen, A.C. Pigou and J. Duesenberry. In the last few years, there is a 
renewed interest in the idea especially in many macroeconomic and  labour 
papers and also in the modern research area of subjective well-being. Many 
theorists in the above fields have found that the incorporation of 
interdependent preferences can help explain a variety  of economic 
phenomena such as wage rigidity, savings patterns and the  Easterlin 
paradox (see Bruni, 2004; Drakopoulos, forthcoming).   
In spite of the above, it is still not accepted by the majority of 
mainstream economists who continue to assume independent individual 
preferences. There are a number of reasons for this attitude which have 
mainly to do with the methodological foundations of mainstream economics.  
More specifically, the notion of interdependent preferences was deliberately 
ignored by the founders of modern mainstream economics such as V. Pareto 
and A. Marshall.  Pareto  thought that interpersonal preferences were not part 
of his definition of “logical action” in economics and  that their analysis belong 
to sociology and not to economics. Marshall was aware of status-driven 
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consumption  but he condemned such expenditures, believing that they were 
rooted in personal vanity and created envy in others. Thus, Marshall’s and 
Pareto’s negative stance towards  incorporating the idea of interpersonal 
preferences can be seen as an important reason why such preferences did 
not become part of  the corpus of subsequent mainstream analysis and also 
of mainstream welfare economics. Mainstream reactions towards the work of 
J. Duesenberry on consumption theory, which is based on the idea of 
interdependent preferences, is  a more modern representative example of this 
stance. It seems that the mainstream methodological preconception against 
incorporating psychological and sociological elements in economic theory and 
also the methodological prevalence of economic agents characterized by 
selfish behaviour, were two crucial reasons for the negative mainstream 
attitude.   
The paper will start with a review of the presence of interdependent 
preferences in the history of economic ideas. Namely, it will argue that the 
idea was present in the works of many pre-classical and classical economists. 
The next section will show that this presence continued in the work of 
theorists such as Veblen and Pigou who explored the analytical 
consequences of such preferences. The fourth section of the paper will 
discuss how  Pareto’s and Marshall’s  negative stance, effectively led to the 
abandonment of such preferences from subsequent mainstream economic 
theorizing. The following section will discuss the mainstream attitude towards 
the work of Duesenberry as the main example of the continuation of 
mainstream disregard and also of the possible reasons for this. The sixth 
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section will provide a brief discussion of  the more recent developments on 
this matter.  Finally, a concluding section will close the paper. 
 
 
2. Interdependent Preferences and Positional Goods in Pre-Classical 
and Classical Thought 
 
The general idea that individual preferences  are influenced by the 
preferences and actions of other individuals is based on the social nature of 
human beings. In fact, one can argue that the social nature of man implies the 
behavioural importance of interdependent preferences and also of positional 
goods. Clearly, the social dimension of human nature is not a novel idea since 
it was first analyzed and emphasized by ancient thinkers and especially by 
Aristotle (for a review see Schneider 2007). In modern times, the Neapolitan    
Antonio Genovesi (1713-68) is one of the first authors whose social and  
economic thinking  is characterized by an  emphasis on the sociality of  
human nature. As Genovesi puts it in an indicative statement:  
We are “created in such a way as to be touched necessarily, by a musical 
sympathy, by pleasure and internal satisfaction, as soon, as we meet 
another man no human being not even the most cruel and hardened can 
enjoy pleasures in which no one else participates (Genovesi, 1766, quoted 
in Bruni, 2007, p.31) 
 
Furthermore, human sociality is seen as the main  function of society given 
that for  Genovesi  the chief advantage of society is not to be found in its 
production of material goods, but in the enjoyment of social relationships 
(Bruni, 2007, p.31). 
Writing in the same period, Sir James Steuart’s economic work  can 
also be seen as having grasped the basis of interdependent preferences and 
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positional goods. As he writes: “the moment  of person begins to live by his 
industry, let his livelihood be ever so poor, he immediately forms little objects 
of ambition, compares his situation with that of his fellows who are a degree 
above him, and considers a shade more of ease, ….. as an advancement, not 
of his happiness only, but also of his rank” (Steuart, 1767, p. 272). 
Furthermore, he seems to have anticipated the well-known concept of  
“conspicuous consumption”.  
“Those, however, who are systematically luxurious, that is, from a 
formed taste and confirmed habit, are but few, in comparison of those 
who becomes so from levity, vanity, and the imitation of others. The 
last  are those who principally support and extend the system; but 
they are not the most incorrigible. Were it not for imitation, every age 
would seek after, and be satisfied with the gratification of natural 
desires” (Steuart ,1767, p. 244 also p. 61). 
 
D. Hume was well aware of the importance of  the social aspect of 
human behaviour. As he states: “The passions are so contagious, that they 
pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce 
correspondent movements in all human breasts” (Hume, 1736, p.605). Similar 
to this,  is Hume’s strong objection to the universal assumption of self-interest 
which implies autonomous and thus non-interdependence of  individual 
preferences: 
“So far from thinking that men have no affection for anything beyond 
themselves, I am of opinion, that though it be rare to meet with one, who 
loves any single person better than himself; yet ‘tis rare to meet with one in 
whom all the kind affections taken together, do not overbalance all the 
selfishness” (Hume, 1736, p.487). 
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The idea of interdependent preferences can also be found in many 
classical economists. Adam Smith recognized that individuals engage in 
social comparisons. Apart from the  natural human motives, such as  the "love 
of life", the "dread of dissolution", the "desire of the continuance and 
perpetuity of the species", etc. (Smith, 1759, p. 77, ft), he also included   "the 
love of distinction" (1759, p. 50). The basis of  this motive is  the human 
"vanity which is  always founded upon the belief of our being the object of 
attention and approbation" (1759, p. 50), and is   "natural to man" (1759, p. 
182). The idea of  comparison of our income to a class or group of individuals 
is also present in his thought (In the twentieth century, this idea became 
known a “keeping up with the Jones’s” ). In Smith’s words: 
“The desire of becoming the proper objects of this respect, of deserving 
and obtaining this credit and rank among our equals, is, perhaps, the 
strongest of all our desires, and our anxiety to obtain the advantages of 
fortune is accordingly much more excited and irritated by this desire, than 
by that of supplying all the necessities and conveniencies of the body, 
which are always very easily supplied." (Smith, 1759, pp. 212-3). 
 
 
Adam Smith’s contemporary,  John Rae was also well-aware of the 
power of consumption imitation. Rae’s ideas on the subject are quite similar 
with the ones expressed subsequently  by T. Veblen, although it is not clear if 
Veblen was aware of Rae’s work (see Edgell and Tilman, 1991). As Rae 
states:  
“Their [i.e. of individuals] consumption is regulated, ill a great degree, 
by the influence of the imitative propensity. We may form a near 
guess whether a person is in the custom of drinking wine, or tea, or 
coffee, or smoking tobacco, from knowing the habits of his 
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associates…[and] ….. Their consumption is also greatly regulated by 
the passion of vanity.” (Rae , 1834, pp. 293-4). 
 
Rae also discusses further the idea of conspicuous consumption (influenced 
to a large extent by Adam Smith)1.  He attributed such behavior  to the 
selfishness and vanity of individuals: “It is not, indeed, to be disputed, that the 
rarity and costliness of the liquors, and other similar commodities consumed 
by an individual, may heighten greatly the absolute pleasure he derives from 
them. This arises from a trait in the character of man, which we have every 
day opportunities of observing. The attention is always roused in a greater 
degree by an object, when it excites more than one faculty” (Rae, 1834, p. 
268). Similarly, Rae seems to have distinguished between mere luxuries and 
what were to become known subsequently as “Giffen goods”. The demand for 
such goods falls if there is a considerable drop in their price: “Were pearls, or 
lace, to be got for one tenth of the labor that must now be given for them, they 
would go completely out of fashion” (Rae, 1834, pp. 270, 292).  
A. Cournot has a very similar approach to Rae’s observation that a fall 
in the price  of some luxury goods will certainly reduce their demand.  Cournot 
admitted that:  
“There are, in fact, some objects of whim and luxury which are only 
desirable on account of their rarity and of the high price which is the 
consequence thereof. If any one should succeed in carrying out cheaply 
the crystallization of carbon, and in producing for one franc the diamond 
which to-day is worth a thousand, it would not be astonishing if diamonds 
should cease to be used in sets of jewellery, and should disappear as 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of  the concept of conspicuous consumption in economic thought, see 
Mayhew, 2002. 
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articles of commerce. In this case a great fall in price would almost 
annihilate the demand” (Cournot 1927, p. 38). 
 
R. Whately argued (1832, p. 51) that the level of consumption and of 
the  consumption pattern is socially determined. The notion of interpersonal 
preferences is present when he argues that  “an individual man  is called 
luxurious, in comparison with other men, of the same community and in the 
same walk of life with himself” (Whately, 1832, p. 53). Similarly, M.  Longfield 
advances the argument that "the wages of the labourer depend upon the 
expense of his maintenance and usual style of his living, instead of his 
expenses and his mode of living depending pretty much upon his wage" 
(Longfield, 1834, p. 203). 
Nassau Senior in his Outline of the Science of Political Economy drew 
attention to what he called ‘the desire for distinction’. Having discussed the 
desire for variety, and having attributed to it the diminishing utility to be gained 
from each additional unit of a particular commodity consumed, Senior 
unequivocally declared it to be less powerful than the desire for distinction:  
“But strong as is the desire for variety, it is weak compared with the 
desire for distinction: a feeling which, if we consider its universality and 
its constancy, that it affects all men and at all times, that it comes with us 
from the cradle, and never leaves us till we go to the grave, may be 
pronounced to be the most powerful of human passions. The most 
obvious source of distinction is the possession of superior wealth” 
(Senior, 1836, p. 12).  
 
Senior makes clear that the main effect of the motive for distinction is to 
influence the rate of demand and utility of special goods of high exchange 
value, such as diamonds (Senior, 1836, p. 13). 
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One can argue that  Marx had also conceived the idea of relative 
income and consumption and in general, of the concept of positional goods. 
Hence the quotation  ‘let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks 
from a little house to a hut’ (Marx, 1849, p. 216).  Furthermore, there are other 
passages where the idea of rising immiseration in spite of the rising real 
wages is also present (see also Hollander, 1984, p. 146).  
J. S. Mill maintains that once a basic standard of living has been 
achieved, the concern about social status becomes extremely strong. The 
subsequent notion of positional goods  is present in the following passage:  
“When once the means of living have been obtained, the far greater part 
of the remaining labour and effort which takes place on earth, has for its 
object to acquire the respect or favourable regard of mankind; to be 
looked up to, or at all events, not to be looked down upon by them.” (Mill 
1874, p. 411) 
 
Finally, by the end of the 19th century, Henry Cunynghame provided 
the  first attempt to illustrate diagrammatically the effect of incorporating 
dependence of one individual’s demand for a good on that of others, is to be 
found in his 1892 article entitled ‘Some Improvements in Simple Geometrical 
Methods of Treating Exchange Value, Monopoly, and Rent’. In introducing this 
new diagram, Cunynghame observed:  
“… almost the whole value of strawberries in March, to those who like 
this tasteless mode of ostentation, is the fact that others cannot get 
them. As my landlady once remarked, ‘Surely, sir, you would not like 
anything so common and cheap as a fresh herring?’. The demand for 
diamonds, rubies, and sapphires is another example of this. As the 
number increases, not only does the price go down, but the very 
pleasure of those who already have them is decreased by their 
becoming common.” (Cunynghame 1892, p. 37)  
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Cunynghame’s diagram showed a consumer surplus curve lying below the 
commodity demand curve, but shifting upwards for every reduction in the 
quantity supplied.  
Thus, as our previous discussion indicated, interpersonal comparisons 
and positional goods were concepts which were present in the economic 
thought of the 18th and especially 19th centuries. It has to be noted that for 
most of the authors discussed, the above ideas were not part of a systematic 
theory of individual economic behaviour. To a large extent this was due to 
their adherence to a cost of production theory of value. This implies that a full 
theory of individual preferences was not a necessary part for the construction 
of economic theories. A more systematic discussion of these ideas, however, 
became apparent with a shift towards a more subjective approach to the 
theory of value which took place in the last decades of the 19th century.  But 
before we proceed to this theme,  let us see first the more systematic 
discussion of  interdependent preferences in the works of  T. Veblen and A.C. 
Pigou. 
 
3. Veblen and Pigou 
 
Interdependent preferences and positional goods are central ideas  in 
Thorstein  Veblen’s main work. A substantial analysis of these concepts and 
of their impact can be found in his  The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899). 
These concepts played such a  fundamental  role in his analysis  that they 
were conceived as the foundation of  a private property society.   In the 
following statement Veblen  combines many aspects of the previous 
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discussion. Namely, he links  consumption and wealth imitation, private 
property and the nature and effect of positional goods:     
“The motive that lies at the root of ownership is emulation; and the same 
motive of emulation continues active in the further development of the 
institution to which it has given rise and in the development of all those 
features of the social structure which the institution of ownership 
touches. The possession of wealth confers honour; it is an invidious 
distinction. Nothing equally cogent can be said for the consumption of 
goods, nor for any other conceivable incentive to acquisition, and 
especially not for any incentive to the accumulation of wealth. … the end 
sought by accumulation is to rank high in comparison with the rest of the 
community in point of pecuniary strength. So long as the comparison is 
distinctly unfavourable to himself, the normal, average individual will live 
in chronic dissatisfaction with his present lot; and when he has reached 
what may be called the normal pecuniary standard of the community, or 
of his class in the community, this chronic dissatisfaction will give place 
to a restless straining to place a wider and ever-widening pecuniary 
interval between himself and this average standard.” (Veblen 1899, pp. 
25-6, 31-2)  
 
Veblen’s famous term, “conspicuous consumption”, is obviously related  
to the above. In particular, conspicuous consumption is the  consumption of 
luxuries that is observed by others, sometimes by these others participating in 
it.  Conspicuous consumption is not confined to the  “rich” or to the  leisure 
class in Veblen’s terminology. Other social classes might also engage in such 
activity even the  lower classes. As he states: 
“[n]o class of society, not even the most abjectly poor, foregoes all 
customary conspicuous consumption. … There is no class and no 
country that has yielded so abjectly before the pressure of physical want 
as to deny themselves all gratification of this higher or spiritual need.” 
(Veblen 1899, p. 85)  
 12 
 
It is clear that in Veblen’s  theoretical analysis,  the idea of interpersonal 
comparisons of income, consumption and wealth are extremely important 
factors for economic and social relationships. 
 Although Veblen’s  ideas as a whole were not very influential for the 
emerging corpus of mainstream theory, the notion of interpersonal 
preferences was not uncommon among leading economists at the time. This 
can be seen in the work of  A.C.  Pigou whose ideas were in the centre of  
mainstream economics of that period. Pigou  devotes considerable space on 
the idea of interdependent preferences and positional goods. He  is clearly 
influenced by Pareto’s differentiation between the terms ‘ophelimity’ and 
‘utility’, which we will examine in the next section. In his words: 
“The curve of the private marginal demand prices lies above the curve of 
collective marginal demand prices if an addition to the consumption of 
one consumer diminishes the ophelimity associated with a given 
consumption by other consumers … The curve of the private marginal 
demand prices lies below the curve of collective marginal demand prices 
if an addition to the consumption of one consumer increases the 
ophelimity associated with a given consumption by other consumers.” 
(Pigou 1910: 361) 
 
The inequality between private and collective demand prices depends on the 
emergence of a social element to individuals’ states of consciousness 
because some or all consumers of a particular product derive utility from their 
direct consumption as well as consumption by third-parties (see also Mclure, 
2009). This is closely linked to his previous analysis in his   ‘Some remarks on 
utility’ (Pigou, 1903) where he  introduces the argument K{a,b} as an element 
within the individual’s utility function of a specific commodity. More 
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specifically,  U  = f (...,K{a,b}) , where K{a,b} is a ‘complex expression’ in 
which the elements a, is the quantity of A possessed by the individual’s first 
neighbour and b is the ‘distance’ from an individual to his/her first neighbour. If 
the consumption of good A by neighbours has no effect on the ophelimity 
enjoyed by an individual from his/her consumption of good A, the ‘distance’ b 
is zero and thus  the value of the complex expression is zero. However,  when 
the consumption of good A by neighbours influences the ophelimity that an 
individual enjoys from his/her consumption of good A, the ‘distance’ in each of 
the elements b is non-zero and the value of the complex expression is non-
zero. Pigou  is clearly influenced by Cunynghame (1892), that people who like 
a tasteless mode of ostentation receive diminished pleasure from some 
commodities when they become more ‘common’ (for an extensive discussion, 
see Mclure, 2009).  
 
 
4.   Pareto, Marshall and  the Rejection 
 
 
As was seen in the previous sections,  the concepts of interdependent 
preferences and positional goods were part of the economic thinking of a 
great number of theorists. However, the marginalist emphasis on the 
subjective theory of value, required a systematic model of individual economic 
decision-making. Thus the issue of the nature of  preferences had to be 
addressed.  Vilfredo Pareto was the first major economist who  provided the 
rational of the  irrelevance of  interdependent preferences for economic 
analysis and thus contributed to their rejection from mainstream economics.  
The basis of Pareto’s approach to preferences are the distinct concepts 
of  ophelimity and utility. For Pareto, the term utility has a general character 
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while the term ophelimity is more specialized to the purposes of economics. 
Economic man is conceived as a rational being in the sense of means-ends 
relationship. This rationality can be achieved through trial and error process. 
Economic man  responds only to forces ophelimity. (Pareto 1896, p. 12).  In 
this framework, preferences are independent. Although Pareto admits  that 
man’s character presents other characteristics too,  these are studied by other 
sciences. Once an individual’s preferences are influenced by interaction with 
the actions and ideas of third-parties, action is considered with respect to 
utility and not ophelimity (McLure, 2009). In  a subsequent article,  (Pareto 
1918),  is more specific on the two scientific domains, in the sense that when 
the ‘economic part’ of the economic phenomena dominates, analysis should 
primarily be based on economic theory; and when the ‘sociological part’ of the 
economic phenomena dominates, analysis should primarily be based on 
sociology  (see also McLure, 2009).   
It is evident that   Pareto’s rejection of interdependent preferences had 
a methodological motive. Pareto  was extremely influenced by the prevailing 
positivist scientific philosophy, a basic characteristic of which, was the 
exclusion of all “metaphysical” and “non-scientific” elements from economics. 
Pareto’s methodological ideal of  economics was that it should be  a 
mathematical science, part of the natural sciences such as physiology and 
chemistry (Pareto, 1896, p.21). This implies that  economics should be freed 
from any sociological or psychological ideas which hamper the application of 
the positivist methodology (for an extensive discussion, see Seligman, 1969; 
Drakopoulos, 1997). Pareto’s model of rational economic man outlined above, 
excludes social influences such as interpersonal preferences.  
 15 
Alfred  Marshall’s influence on the formation of modern mainstream 
microeconomics is widely recognized. Marshall was aware of  consumption 
for the purposes of status,  but he condemned such behaviour basically on 
ethical grounds: 
“There is some misuse of wealth in all ranks of society. And though, 
speaking generally, we may say that every increase in the wealth of the 
working classes adds to the fullness and nobility of human life, because 
it is used chiefly in the satisfaction of real wants; yet even among the 
artisans in England, and perhaps still more in new countries, there are 
signs of the growth of that unwholesome desire for wealth as a means of 
display which has been the chief bane of the well-to-do classes in every 
civilized country. Laws against luxury have been futile; but it would be a 
gain if the moral sentiment of the community could induce people to 
avoid all sorts of display of individual wealth. There are indeed true and 
worthy pleasures to be got from wisely ordered magnificence: but they 
are at their best when free from any taint of personal vanity on the one 
side and envy on the other;” (Marshall, 1890, book III, ch. VI) 
 
Thus, Marshall effectively refused to consider further status-driven 
consumption. Furthermore, he was reluctant to discuss the general case of 
interpersonal effects on demand mainly because it would have called into 
question the  fundamental assumption of the standard theory, that aggregate 
demand could be derived from the simple addition of individual  demand 
schedules (Mason, 1995). Although a number of authors such as 
Cunynghame (1892) and Foley (1893) clearly pointed this lack concerning 
status driven consumption, Marshall did not analyse the issue further in 
subsequent editions of his Principles (see also Mason, 1995). 
 In general, Pareto and Marshall, two extremely dominant figures for the 
formation of mainstream economics, had a negative attitude towards 
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incorporating interdependent preferences in economic analysis. Pareto’s 
extremely influential methodological ideas against including sociological and 
psychological elements in economics, and Marshall’s explicit refusal to accept 
their role, seem to be the main reasons for the mainstream rejection. 
 
5. J. Duesenberry and the Reappearance of Interdependent Preferences  
 
As was observed in the previous pages, the idea of interdependent 
preferences was effectively marginalized from mainstream economic analysis 
although it had a constant presence in the history of economic thought. This 
was mainly due to the influence of Pareto and Marshall concerning this issue. 
The next major analytical use of the concept of interdependent preferences 
appeared in the work of James Duesenberry  in his main book published in 
1949. One can view Duesenberry’s work as a continuation of Veblen’s, given 
that there are many common points concerning income and consumption 
comparisons, and also of the demonstration effect (see  McCormick, 1983).  
In particular, Duesenberry is known as the proponent of the relative 
consumption hypothesis, the basic idea of which was that  ”Any particular  
consumer will be influenced by consumption of people with whom he has 
social contacts” (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 48). This idea (labeled as the 
demonstration effect) questioned the established mainstream view that 
absolute levels of income only determine patterns of consumer demand 
(Duesenberry, 1949, p. 27) Duesenberry proceeded further to analyze the 
basis of such behaviour. As he writes: 
“We can maintain then that the frequency and strength of impulses to 
increase expenditure depends on frequency of contact with goods 
superior to those habitually consumed. This effect need not depend at all 
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on considerations of emulation or ‘conspicuous consumption’.” 
(Duesenberry 1949: 27-28). 
 
Duesenberry’s consumption approach shows how levels of 
expenditure could be increased not by changes in income or prices, but by 
following the consumption expenditures of others with whom the individual 
had contacts (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 29). This implies important 
consequences for a number of important issues like  the pattern of savings 
and growth as  Duesenberry himself intended. In this framework,  savings 
rates depend  on the position of income distribution and not exclusively on 
the income level, as in a traditional savings function.  
However, much in the same way as the previous approaches on 
interdependent preferences,  Duesenberry’s ideas  never gained popularity 
among mainstream theorists. The reaction of  Robert Clower a few years  
after Duesenberry’s publication,  is indicative: 
 
“Interdependent preferences analysis differs but little from ordinary 
consumption theory; hence, while one sometimes gets different and 
slightly more general results in “interdependent” as compared with 
“independent” preference analysis, it is only in this very limited and 
practically unimportant sense that the two kinds of theory may be said 
to be at variance with one another.” (Clower, 1951, 178) 
 
The position of  Modigliani and Brumberg towards interdependent 
preferences, and more specifically towards their specific expression in 
Duesenberry’s analysis,  is somewhat different from Clower’s. Although, 
initially, Modigliani (1949) embraced this idea in his own research 
concerning relative income effects on consumption,  he was much more 
 18 
critical later on arguing that it contained  unnecessary   social and 
psychological elements. Instead, they claimed that their (Modigliani and 
Brumberg)  new interpretation of consumption theory was sounder and much 
simpler (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954, 424; Mason, 2000).  
Thus, interpersonal preferences were once again excluded from the 
mainstream corpus of economic theory. One basic reason for this is that 
Duesenberry’s analysis poses some fundamental questions regarding the 
cultural influences on economic decisions and the endogeneity of 
preferences, issues which were not popular for orthodox theorists.  Thus, it  
seems that  allegedly simpler explanations of consumption patterns offered by 
Modigliani, Brumberg  and Friedman were preferred to Duesenberry’s 
sophisticated approach (see also Harbaugh, 1996; Cowling, 2006). Another  
important reason for the lack of acceptance of his ideas was the serious 
problems that they posed for the conventional aggregate demand theory 
which assumes that individual consumption behaviour was independent of the 
consumption of others. If preferences are not independent, aggregate 
demand cannot be derived from the simple summation of individual demand 
schedules (see also Mason, 2000).  
 
6. Recent Developments 
For many years after its analytical treatment in the work of 
Duesenberry, the concept of interdependent preferences was again effectively 
ignored by the mainstream corpus of economic theory. The notion was utilized 
though, by a few notable economists like  Harvey Leibenstein, (1950)  where 
the interdependence  of individual preference functions is called the 
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“bandwagon effect”, by J.K. Galbraith (1969) who  built on many of Veblen's 
insights into consumer interdependence, conspicuous consumption and 
competitive emulation, and by Fred Hirsch  (1976) who introduced the 
concept of positional consumption and positional goods. Furthermore,  non-
mainstream schools  such as the behavioural and post-Keynesian schools 
also continued to pay attention to the idea (for an extensive review, see 
Drakopoulos, forthcoming). However, the vast majority of mainstream 
economists still treated individual preferences as independent.  
 In the last two decades though, the research potential of interpersonal 
preferences has started to be realized by an increasing number of economists 
and thus it has begun to re-appear in some economic literature. There is an 
increasing use of ideas such as reference income, target income, relative 
consumption and positional goods which are all based on the concept of 
interdependent preferences. The subfields of macro and labour economics 
are indicative examples. In particular, the idea that unions and workers 
compare income or wages with others has been expressed in a plethora of 
terms such as relative wage, fair wage,  aspiration wage, comparison or target 
wage.  [see for instance, Frank (1984), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Clark and 
Oswald (1996), Charness and Grosskopf (2001)]. Furthermore, in the last two 
decades the notion of comparison income has also entered the job 
satisfaction literature and more recently the quite fashionable subfield of 
happiness research, mainly in formulations examining the relationship 
between income and happiness level (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1996, Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002; Drakopoulos, 2008). In spite of the above, the concept  with its 
specific expression of comparison income or interdependent utilities, is still 
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not accepted by the economics orthodoxy.      
 One can argue that there are some reasons for the continuous 
mainstream resistance towards interdependent preferences. One of those 
reasons might have to do with  their serious  theoretical consequences. A 
number of authors have shown that that the full incorporation of 
interdependent preferences and of the related concept of the comparison or 
relative income, in economic theory, would cast serious doubts on many well-
established and important theoretical results. Namely, optimal taxation, 
economic growth and income distribution theories might need serious 
rethinking towards more progressive taxation and more emphasis on more 
equal income distribution (for reviews, see Dugger, 1985; Postlewaite, 1998; 
Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008, and  for the  implications of interdependent 
preferences for general equilibrium, see Ackerman, 1997).   
 Another reason for the rejection of interdependent preferences has to 
do with the orthodox conception that economic agents are characterized by 
selfish preferences. In fact, self-interest was one of the cornerstones of the 
traditional model of individual economic behaviour (economic man). This is 
certainly still the case for many modern standard formulations. As R. Frank 
observes: “To many economists, the notion of consumers being strongly 
influenced by demonstration effects must have seemed troublingly 
inconsistent with the reasoned pursuit of self-interest, if not completely 
irrational” (Frank, 1985, p.146). Mainstream resistance to question self-
interested behaviour is still very strong in spite of abundant  research 
indicating otherwise. The assumption is so embedded that  as Rabin points 
out “A remarkable amount of energy has been devoted to giving self-
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interested explanations for laboratory behaviour that seems to be a departure 
from self-interest” (Rabbin, 2002, p.667).      
 Finally, another reason which is closely linked to the above is that 
mainstream economists are extremely reluctant to consider psychological and 
sociological  aspects of human behaviour in their economic analysis. 
Concepts such as social status, positional goods, rank concerns and 
consumer conformism which are all based on interdependent preferences, are 
thought as not belonging to the realm of economics. The “economic” 
approach to human behaviour is seen as extremely successful and superior 
compared to other social sciences. Gary  Becker’s definition of the economic 
approach is indicative of this attitude: “The combined assumptions of 
maximizing behaviour, market equilibrium and stable preferences, used 
relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach … 
provides a valuable unified framework for understanding all human behavior” 
(Becker, 1976, p.5). Although Becker’s statement was made more than three 
decades ago, most mainstream economists still adhere to it (see also Rabin, 
2002). 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
The notion of interdependent preferences and positional goods has 
had a long presence in the history of economic ideas. Our discussion showed 
that it was present in the works of many 18th and 19th centuries authors like A. 
Genovesi, D. Hume,  J. Rae,  A. Smith, K. Marx and J. S. Mill among others. It 
was also seen that the idea played an important role  in the works of  T. 
Veblen and A.C. Pigou. By the turn of the 20th century however, V. Pareto and 
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A. Marshall effectively put a stop to its further incorporation in mainstream 
economics. The main reason for this, was the gradual establishment of  
methodological ideas  which did not favour the  inclusion of sociological and 
psychological elements in economics. This was deemed to be essential for 
the drive of establishing a “positive” economic science. After, WWII the 
concept of  interpersonal preferences regained momentum mainly in the work 
of J. Duesenberry on consumption theory. However, Duesenberry’s approach 
was also ignored in favour of allegedly more “simple” and “sound” 
consumption theories.  
In the last two decades, there seems to be a renewed interest in the 
notion by some labour economists and also by theorists in the relatively new 
subfields of the economics of  subjective well-being, mainly because of its 
research potential towards analysing and explaining numerous contemporary 
economic issues. Still, however, mainstream  economists  are not willing to 
accept that  agents do not have independent preferences.  
Our discussion indicated that there are some basic reasons which 
might account for the continuous resistance to incorporate interdependent  
preferences in mainstream economic theory.  The traditional refusal to accept 
the role of psychological and sociological dimensions of economic behaviour 
might be seen as an important reason. This is connected to the standard 
conception of economic agents as selfish utility maximizers which implies 
independent preferences. Clearly, this is due to the methodological 
foundations of mainstream economics which can be traced to the emergence 
of the marginalist school. The other reason was the serious problems that 
interdependent preferences posed for the conventional aggregate demand 
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theory. Many contemporary mainstream theorists, just like Marshall, have 
realized that many well established theoretical results might need serious 
rethinking if preferences are not independent. Thus, our discussion of the 
history of interdependent preferences indicates that the old methodological 
mainstream preconceptions concerning human behaviour and “positive” 
economics, are still extremely strong. 
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